On the Decision to Make New Law: The Needs of Society Versus the Rights of the Accused by Jarvis, Robert M.
Pace Law Review
Volume 5
Issue 2 Winter 1985 Article 9
January 1985
On the Decision to Make New Law: The Needs of
Society Versus the Rights of the Accused
Robert M. Jarvis
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace
Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert M. Jarvis, On the Decision to Make New Law: The Needs of Society Versus the Rights of the
Accused, 5 Pace L. Rev. 529 (1985)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss2/9
Book Review
On the Decision to Make New Law: The
Needs of Society Versus the Rights of the
Accused. Cannibalism and the Common
Law
By A. W. Brian Simpson.* Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press 1984. Pp. ix, 353. $25.00.
Reviewed by Robert M. Jarvist
The year 1984 marked the one hundredth anniversary of
perhaps the most celebrated of all murder cases in Anglo-Ameri-
can jurisprudence. In Regina v. Dudley & Stephens,' an English
court2 held that the defendants, a captain and a sailor who had
killed a fellow crew member after their ship had been capsized
and their food had run out, were guilty of murder. The defense's
excuse that the killing had been undertaken as a necessary act of
self-preservation was rejected as being insufficient under the
law.
The received wisdom of the opinion is that it prohibits a
human being from legally killing another human being where the
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago and University of Kent, Canterbury.
t Member, New York and Arizona bars; associate, Haight, Gardner, Poor & Havens;
B.A., Northwestern University; J.D., University of Pennsylvania.
1. 14 Q.B.D. 273, 287-88 (1884).
2. The defendants were tried before Baron Huddleston at Exeter assizes and were
found guilty upon a special verdict. The opinion that is always cited and relied on, how-
ever, is that of Lord Coleridge, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884). The special verdict at Exeter as-
sizes was sent to the Queen's Bench Division for review under the terms of the Judica-
ture Act of 1873, which completely reorganized the English central courts. The question
of whether the Queen's Bench Division was the proper court to hear the review (for it
was not strictly an appeal) is taken up in A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, CANNIBALISM AND THE
COMMON LAW, 218-23 (1984).
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person killed presented no threat of harm to the killer.3 The case
has generated a number of writings,4 and the matter was author-
itatively reviewed by Donald McCormick's lengthy Blood on the
Sea.6 Thus it seems curious that yet another book has been
thought necessary, and one may legitimately wonder whether
any writer could usefully add to the vast literature already
produced.
Professor Simpson's book, however, admirably answers both
concerns. Backed by painstaking research,' his Cannibalism and
the Common Law provides new information regarding the facts
surrounding the voyage of the Mignonette, the ill-fated fishing
boat that gave rise to the proceedings against Dudley and Ste-
phens.7 As for the issue of usefulness, Professor Simpson's book
often achieves the purpose set out for it in the preface: to place
3. The defense of self-preservation should not be confused with self-defense. The
former relates to the killing of another human being even though he does not pose a
threat, while the latter refers to the killing of another human being who does pose a
threat. Of course, such distinctions are somewhat metaphysical, for it could be argued
that by continuing to live (rather than being dead and providing food) the person to be
killed does pose a threat. In addition, there is always the possibility that unless the other
person is killed he will kill so as to obtain food for himself. Thus, killing can be seen as a
pre-emptive act that crosses over into the field of self-defense. Courts have generally
rejected the notion that a person may raise a defense of "anticipatory" self-defense. In
State v. Schroeder, 199 Neb. 822, 822, 261 N.W.2d 759, 761 (1978), a 19 year old inmate
stabbed his cellmate while the cellmate was asleep. The reputation of the deceased was a
violent one, and he had threatened the killer with rape. The majority of the court, how-
ever, found no error in the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on self-defense.
4. See, e.g., Mallin, In Warm Blood: Some Historical and Procedural Aspects of
Regina v. Dudley and Stephens, 34 U. Cm. L. REv. 387 (1967). Indeed, Professor Simpson
himself, in preparation for his book, wrote on the case in Simpson, Cannibals at Com-
mon Law, 77 U. CHI. L. SCHOOL REc. 3 (1981).
5. D. MCCORMICK, BLOOD ON THE SEA (1962). McCormick's book is cited in SIMPSON,
supra note 2, at 44-45, 59, 70, 291-94. Professor Simpson is, however, quite critical of
McCormick's scholarship. McCormick suggested in his account of the story that a key
figure was a transvestite girl named Otilia Ribeiro, alias Ricardo Parker and Jack Straw.
Professor Simpson argues that such a figure never existed, and that McCormick's ac-
count of the defendant Dudley as a man in moral decline is incorrect. SIMPSON, supra
note 2, at 292-94.
6. As part of the preparation for his book, Professor Simpson signed on as a sailor
on the brigantine Eye of the Wind. SIMPSON, supra note 2, at xi.
7. One of the most illuminating passages in the book concerns why the vessel foun-
dered. Professor Simpson explains that the most likely cause for the disaster was im-
properly fitted planking below the waterline, which sprung loose from the frames. Previ-
ous explanations had centered on "stress of weather" and the stiffness of her handling
due to her lead ballasts. Id. at 50-53.
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the case in the social and historical context in which it was
tried.
Professor Simpson's thesis is that the practice of survival
cannibalism,9 which was common among sailors following marine
casualities in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,"0 so
shocked Victorian morality that English law enforcement offi-
cials felt compelled to bring this bewildering custom of the sea
to task before a court of law.1"
Professor Simpson lays out his thesis in ten chapters, but
these chapters can conveniently be divided into four separate
parts. The first part, made up of chapters one through four, re-
counts the voyage of the unfortunate vessel and her equally un-
lucky crew. 12  We learn of the perilous journey that was
charted, 3 the capsizing of the vessel while running in heavy
seas, and the reduction to starvation of the crew. Finally, Profes-
8. In the Preface, Professor Simpson explained his goal by writing:
McCormick's Blood on the Sea . . . did not set out to relate the story (which he
imaginatively elaborated) to legal and maritime history generally. The isolation of
a leading case from its historical context may be acceptable for certain legal pur-
poses, but an exploration of the strange world of survival cannibalism and its con-
flict with Victorian parlor morality and the common law will, I hope, make it clear
that no real understanding of the story of the yacht Mignonette and the leading
case to which its loss at sea gave rise is really possible without journeying well
outside orthodox legal sources.
Id. at x.
9. Survival cannibalism is the practice of eating human flesh solely for the purpose
of saving oneself, when no other source of food is available. It is to be distinguished from
cannibalism, which is practiced for other reasons, such as part of a religious ceremony.
See id. at 112-14.
10. The practice surely evolved earlier, yet the lack of records makes it difficult to
document accurately the origins of marine survival cannibalism. Although Professor
Simpson describes an incident that occurred sometime between 1629 and 1640, the lead-
ing incidents are all from the 18th and 19th centuries. See id. at 122-40.
11. The officials responsible apparently were members of the Home Office and the
treasury solicitor. Id. at 195.
12. We also learn, however, that three crew members of the Mignonette were, in
fact, very lucky. William and Jim Frost had agreed to serve as members of the crew, but
for reasons not entirely clear, never sailed on the ill-starred voyage. Id. at 29. Likewise,
James R. Haynes was employed as ship's mate, but he deserted the vessel early in the
voyage. Id. at 31.
13. The purpose of the journey was to go from England to Australia. Id. at 20. The
voyage was between 14,000 and 16,000 miles long. The Mignonette was to use a route
along the Cape of Good Hope. In addition to the length of the voyage, the path chosen
would keep the vessel away from shipping lanes, where it could be spotted by a passing
ship. Id. at 40-41.
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sor Simpson relates the decision of the crew, which had been
driven nearly mad from hunger and thirst,14 to kill Richard
Parker, the seventeen year-old ordinary seaman15 who was sail-
ing for only the second time in his life."6
These chapters also provide a description of the arrest of
the survivors, who, following the practice of the day, freely ad-
mitted to the killing.17 There is Captain Tom Riley Dudley, a
sailor since the age of nine," who was the first to suggest that
someone would have to die in order to provide food for the
others, 19 and the one who actually performed the killing. We
also meet Edwin Stephens,"° the mate, who helped to kill Rich-
ard Parker by holding him down.21 Finally there is "Ned"
Brooks,22 who demurred to the killing and was later induced to
turn Queen's evidence.23
14. That the castaways would have been driven mad without food is understanda-
ble. That they would have been driven mad for lack of water needs some explanation. In
1884, the conventional wisdom was that drinking seawater would kill a man after causing
a period of insanity; thus, the survivors did not dare drink seawater. Today, however, it
is known that seawater can be consumed safely, if only a small amount is swallowed at a
time and the practice is begun before the body has been allowed to become overly dehy-
drated. Id. at 57-61.
15. An Ordinary Seaman (O.S.) is a member of the crew who, although subordinate
to an Able-Bodied Seaman (A.B.), has learned part of his trade. After a specified length
of time, and upon the passing of an examination, the O.S. can sign on as an A. B. R. DE
KERCHOVE. INTERNATIONAL MARITIME DICTIONARY 554 (2d ed. 1961).
16. Previously, Richard Parker sailed aboard the Daphne in 1883. He came from a
long family tradition of sailors and sailing. SIMPsoN, supra note 2, at 37-38.
17. The subject of the defendants' candor in admitting the crime is taken up at
length in Chapter 1. See id. at 10-11.
18. Dudley's sailing career prior to captaining the Mignonette is recounted id. at 21-
27.
19. Id. at 60-61. By the time-honored tradition of the sea, the victim is chosen by
drawing lots. The man who picks the shortest lot becomes the victim; and the man se-
lecting the second shortest lot serves as executioner. In this case, it is not clear whether
lots were drawn at all. Some stories suggest lots were drawn, others indicate that a sham
lot, rigged to select Parker, was drawn, while others suggest that no lots were drawn. Id.
at 66.
20. For a description of Stephens' life, see id. at 31-35. Stephens was a particularly
unfortunate man. While he was sailing aboard the European as first officer, that vessel
sank in 1877. Although Stephens escaped formal censure (his captain did not) after this
event, he admitted his liability and thereafter found it difficult to locate work. Id. at 32-
35.
21. Id. at 66-67.
22. Ned Brooks' real name was Edmund James. For biographical information on
James, see id. at 35-36.
23. On the issue of the decision to use Brooks as a witness for the prosecution, see
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss2/9
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The next part of the book, consisting of chapters five and
six, 4 provides an understanding of the sailors' grisly custom of
practicing cannibalism, seemingly without remorse or reserva-
tion. 5 We read in grim detail of a number of ships that fell to
cannibalism, 6 and of the even more grisly fact that the survivors
were often spotted by other ships who would not come by to
rescue them, thus causing or furthering the cannibalism. 21 We
also learn about land-based cannibals, a curious collection of in-
dividuals with such colorful names as Liver-Eating Johnson. 28
We meet, for instance, Alferd Packer,' 9 whose distinctions in-
clude having eaten most of the Democrats in a Colorado
county"° and being the namesake of the student grill in Boulder,
Colorado.3' We also become acquainted with Alexander Pearce,
a fugitive from a Tasmanian penal colony, 2 and, in a modern
encounter, with the Uruguayan rugby team that was forced to
id. at 90-91. Professor Simpson suggests that a vital deposition that would have impli-
cated Brooks in the murder, and thus made him useless as a witness for the Crown,
might have been discreetly suppressed.
24. It would have been better if these two chapters began the book, rather than
appearing in the middle as they do. They are wonderfully written and provide an excel-
lent introduction into the whole subject of cannibalism and civilized society's revulsion
to the practice.
25. Chapter Five also provides an excellent discussion of the grim conditions of a
sailor's life, which may have made him less squeamish about the idea of cannibalism. See
id. at 101-10.
26. Professor Simpson lists more than a dozen ships that fell to cannibalism, an
amazingly large number even when it is remembered that the 18th and 19th centuries
were filled with maritime disasters. Id. at 98-99.
27. As Professor Simpson explains: "Merely to be spotted was at this period abso-
lutely no guarantee of salvation; rescue might be too dangerous or even pointless if the
other vessel had no provisions to spare." Id. at 118.
28. Apparently Johnson only ate the livers of his victims. Id. at 145.
29. For a discussion of Packer's life, see id. at 150-59.
30. Id. at 157-58. Larry Dolan, a Saquache barkeeper and a former drinking com-
panion of Packer's, was reported to have explained the court's decision to hang Packer in
the following manner:
There were seven democrats in Hinsdale County, and you've ate five of them, God
damn you. I sentence you to be hanged by the neck until you is dead, dead, dead,
as a warning against reducing the democrat population of the state. Packer, you
Republican cannibal, I would sentence you to hell but the Statutes forbid it.
Id. at 158.
31. Id. at 282. Packer's exploits have achieved a far-ranging fame, if it can be called
fame. The public's fascination with Packer is recounted in some detail. See id. at 271-82.
32. For a discussion of Pearce's life, see id. at 147-50. Professor Simpson says Pearce
is the only known example of a recidivist cannibal. Id. at 150.
5
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:529
cannibalism after their plane crashed high in the Andes in
1972.2
The third part of the book, chapters seven, eight, and nine,
discusses the proceedings against Dudley and Stephens."' Chap-
ter Seven is perhaps the most interesting chapter in the book; it
is certainly the best written and most illuminating. It recounts
two cases decided prior to Regina v. Dudley & Stephens35 in
which attempts to have maritime survival cannibalism declared
illegal failed. It is through these cases that we come to under-
stand that Dudley and Stephens were prosecuted in order to put
the practice of survival cannibalism at sea on trial.
The earlier of the two cases is United States v. Holmes."
Eight crewmen and thirty-three passengers were cast adrift on
the high seas following the wreck of the William Brown. Eigh-
teen passengers in the lifeboat, almost all of whom were male,37
were forced by members of the crew" to jump into the icy wa-
ters to certain death. The purpose of the crew was to make
enough room in the little boat 9 so that efforts could be made to
navigate her properly and to bail water."'
A passing ship eventually picked up the remaining survi-
vors. Once back in the United States, Alexander Holmes, one of
33. Id. at 110-11. The Fairchild F-227 airplane, which had been carrying the team,
crashed in the Andes on October 13, 1972. It should be pointed out that the survivors of
the crash did not kill any of their victims. They lived off the bodies of those who had
died because of the extreme harshness of the mountain weather. See generally P. READ,
ALIVE (1974).
34. For those who have read the actual decision against Dudley and Stephens, the
material presented in these chapters is even more fascinating, because it explores the
many steps which were taken to ensure that the decision came out against the
defendants.
35. 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884).
36. 26 F. Cas. 360 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842) (No. 15,383).
37. SIMPSON, supra note 2, at 167-68. Some of the passengers appear to have thrown
themselves overboard voluntarily.
38. Only five of the eight crewmen aboard took an active part in the forcing of the
passengers out of the boat. Those five were: Charley Smith, Alexander Williams (Alexan-
der William Holmes), Joseph Stetson, Henry Murray, and Isaac Freeman. Id. at 168.
39. The boat was said to be 22 1/2 feet long. Id. at 164. Although the captain rated
the chances of survival for the lifeboat to be one percent, id. at 166, Professor Simpson
points out that there were earlier instances of small boats that made near-miraculous
voyages to safety, such as Captain Bligh's 3,600 mile voyage following the mutiny aboard
the H.M.S. Bounty. Id. at 164.
40. Id. at 170.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss2/9
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the crewmen, was charged with manslaughter after the grand
jury refused to return an indictment for murder."' Holmes was
particularly unlucky - although at least five of the crewmen
had participated in the jettisoning of the passengers,42 only
Holmes ever stood trial for the deaths.4 3
Holmes was convicted of the charge of manslaughter, and
was also fined twenty dollars.44 Although accounts of the case
have always cited the decision for the proposition that no one
has the right to take the life of another human being who poses
no threat,'45 Professor Simpson ably advances an alternate the-
ory 6 Judge Baldwin, the presiding judge in the case,'7 gave the
41. For a discussion of the case, see F. HIcKs, HUMAN JETTISON (1927). See also
SIMPSON, supra note 2, at 164-66.
42. See supra note 38. Interestingly enough, Francis Rhodes, the mate who com-
manded the boat, did not stand trial. It has been suggested that Rhodes gave the actual
order that began the jettisoning, although, as Professor Simpson points out, there is con-
siderable doubt as to whether Rhodes gave such an order. SIMPSON, supra note 2, at 168.
43. Holmes did throw a number of men overboard, and called out for help to throw
over Frank Askins, the only passenger seriously to resist the attempt to be thrown over-
board. Id. at 168. On the other hand, Holmes had the foresight to order everyone to lie
down when a passing ship was spotted, lest the large number of survivors scare away the
potential salvor. Id. at 170. As has been explained, see supra note 27, it was common-
place for a salvor to turn away from passengers in distress.
Although Professor Simpson does not mention it, the problem was aggravated by the
fact that at this time a ship that picked up castaways did not receive any compensation
for her efforts, although such compensation was explicitly required for the salving of
cargo. This unhappy state of affairs caused "a natural temptation to save property first
and look around for survivors later." G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY §
8-1, at 532 (2d ed. 1975). The problem was somewhat ameliorated in 1910 with the enact-
ment of an International Convention on Salvage, which provided that life savers were to
share in any award received by property salvors. Life salvage unaccompanied by prop-
erty salvage, however, still went unrewarded. Despite the fact that numerous articles
criticized this approach, see, e.g., Friedell, Compensation and Reward for Saving Life at
Sea, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1218 (1979); Jarett, The Life Salvor Problem in Admiralty, 63
YALE L. J. 779 (1954), no change was made in the recently finalized Draft Salvage Con-
vention prepared by the Comitk Maritime International (CMI). The Draft, which was
approved by the CMI during its thirty-second meeting in Montreal in the spring of 1981,
is reprinted in 57 TUL. L. REV. 1448 (1983) (The key provision, Article 3-5, appears at
1453.).
44. In addition to the fine, Holmes was sentenced to six months' imprisonment at
hard labor. Because he had been in prison for six months already, he did not serve any
additional time. The fine was remitted. SIMPSON, supra note 2, at 175.
45. E.g., B. CARDOzO, LAW AND LITERATURE 110-114 (1930). Writing in his usual ele-
gant style, Justice Cardozo asked: "Who shall choose in such an hour between the vic-
tims and the saved? Who shall know when masts and sails of rescue may emerge out of
the fog?" Id. at 113.
46. See SIMPSON, supra note 2, at 174-76.
19851
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jury a complex charge.'8 Under the instruction, the jury was told
that it could find Holmes innocent if it found that casting away
passengers was necessary in order to preserve the sailors who
worked the boat. As Professor Simpson notes, this charge poten-
tially permitted a defense of necessity to succeed if it could be
shown that the choice of who was to die was done in a rational
manner." Because the jury found Holmes guilty on a general
verdict50 it is impossible to say whether they rejected the idea of
rational selection entirely, or merely found there was no need in
the particular circumstances to save the sailors in preference to
the passengers." This ambiguity in the result, according to Pro-
fessor Simpson, "deprived U.S. v. Holmes of the chance to be-
come the central case" on the question of maritime survival can-
nibalism and the defense of necessity.2
The other incident recounted at length in Chapter Seven
47. The case was also heard by Justice Randall of the Circuit Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania. Id. at 174. The circuit courts were abolished in 1911 after years
of complaint and controversy. Act of March 3, 1911, 36 Stat. 1087 (1911), repealed by
Revised Judicial Code of 1948, 62 Stat. 869.
48. According to the charge, a defense of necessity would be a complete defense if
all of the following factors were found: (i) a case of necessity existed; (2) the slayer was
faultless; (3) the slayer owed no duty to the victim; and, (4) the slayer was under no legal
duty to make his own safety secondary. Although (1) certainly existed and (2) might
have existed, Holmes could hardly have hoped to succeed in proving the third and fourth
requirements. The accepted wisdom was that members of the crew owed a duty to the
passengers. Nevertheless, Holmes' jury asked that mercy be shown to Holmes. SIMPSON,
supra note 2, at 175.
49. Id. Some argue, however, that no measure is rational, although if lots are drawn
fairly, such a method is at least just because it gives each drawer an equal chance. As has
been pointed out, see supra note 19, the lots drawn were often sham lots. In addition, it
is not entirely correct to say that drawing unrigged lots gives each drawer an equal
chance to be picked or spared. As each lot is drawn, every subsequent drawer's chances
improve or worsen depending upon the draws that precede his own. This point is made
in cases where the accused has played Russian roulette. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Atencio, 345 Mass. 627, 189 N.E.2d 223 (1963).
50. A general verdict provides only whether the defendant in a criminal case is inno-
cent, guilty, or innocent by reason of insanity. Of course, juries are able to give their
reasons if they are asked to return either a general verdict with interrogatories or a spe-
cial verdict. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1398-99 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). Thus, Professor
Simpson's statement that "juries give no reasons" is wrong. See SIMPSON, supra note 2,
at 176.
51. SIMPSON, supra note 2, at 175-76.
52. Id. at 176. An illuminating discussion of the issues raised in cases such as




involves the sinking of a collier5 3 known as the Euxine in
1874.'4 The vessel was lost after her cargo of coal spontaneously
combusted, 55 a peril that still plagues modern ships.5' The Eux-
ine was lost on August 9th after extensive efforts to save her
failed.57 The survivors were then put into three boats. The third
boat, which was under the command of James Archer, the sec-
ond mate, held a total of eight men.5 For the next three weeks
Archer's boat (and her passengers) suffered in the stormy seas;
two men drowned, although one has been suggested as being a
suicide.5 9 On the morning of August 31st, with no food or water
remaining, the decision to kill Francis Gioffuss, an unpopular
member of the crew,60 was made. 1 Five hours later,62 the Dutch
barque Java Packet rescued the boat.6 3
Following the rescue of Archer and the other survivors, ex-
tensive efforts were made to bring the killers to trial. 4 In order
to give the decision an unmistakable binding quality, an attempt
was made to try the men in an English court.6 5 When it proved
53. A collier is a vessel specially designed for the carriage of coal cargoes. The term
is also loosely applied to any vessel that regularly engages in the coal trade, regardless of
whether it is specially outfitted for such trade. R. DE KERCHOVE, supra note 15, at 164.
The Euxine had originally been built as a paddle steamer, but in 1868 she was rede-
signed to carry coal. SIMPSON, supra note 2, at 176-77.
54. The Euxine disaster is recounted in SIMPSON, supra note 2, at 176-94.
55. Id. at 177.
56. See, e.g., Tai Ping Insurance Co. v. MN Warschau, 731 F.2d 1141 (5th Cir.
1984); Ente Nazionale Per L'Energia Elettrica v. Baliwag Navigation, Inc., 1984 A.M.C.
2858 (E.D.Va. 1984).
57. According to Professor Simpson, the coal overheated on August 5th, the vessel
was abandoned on August 8th, and all hopes of saving her died on August 9th. SIMPSON,
supra note 2, at 177.
58. Id. at 178.
59. Id. at 179.
60. The victim was selected by the drawing of lots. There is considerable dispute as
to whether the lots were sham lots. See id. at 181.
61. Professor Simpson does not say what caused his unpopularity. See id. at 179-80.
62. The sighting of a vessel shortly after the killing, which obviated the need to kill
Gioffus, makes Justice Cardozo's comment, see supra note 45, especially chilling. Per-
haps Justice Cardozo's comments were based on the case of Euxine, which was still a
quite famous matter, even in 20th century America.
63. SIMPSON, supra note 2, at 181.
64. For the efforts that were undertaken, see id. at 182-91.
65. Professor Simpson points out that a trial in London would have solved other
problems as well. The original depositions in which the killers implicated themselves
(recall the candor of seamen in admitting to cannibalism, as explained supra note 17)
were held by the Board of Trade in London. Since at this time duplicates could not be
9
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impossible for an English court to obtain jurisdiction over the
men,"6 the men were not prosecuted."7 The alternative course of
prosecuting the men in a colonial court in Singapore was consid-
ered to be useless, because it would not result in an opinion by a
respected (and thus binding) court.6 8
With the discussion of the Euxine complete, Professor
Simpson turns to the proceedings of Dudley and Stephens' trial.
In chapters eight and nine we are introduced to the prosecutors,
defense attorneys and jurymen who heard the case. A fascinating
picture of Victorian-era England emerges and we are able to
catch glimpses of a now bygone world. We also are taken
through the extensive efforts of the prosecution to insulate the
proceedings from later charges that the trial was defective or
rigged,69 as well as through the many procedural irregularities
which did, in fact, occur. 0 Finally, we learn of Dudley and Ste-
admitted into evidence, the originals were absolutely necessary to try the men. For some
incomprehensible reason, no suggestion was ever made to send the originals to the place
where the men could be brought to trial. Id. at 188.
66. The reason the English courts could not obtain jurisdiction was because there
were local courts functioning in Singapore, where the Java Packet (and later the
Namoa) had eventually let the men off. Id. at 181-82. Under a case known as the Sat-
suma the men had to be tried by the colony court of Singapore, despite protests that the
matter should be tried in England. Id. at 183-85.
67. Id. at 189.
68. The matter was explained in the following terms:
The law as laid down in an English Court would have more weight in all parts of
the world and would probably be considered binding in all parts of the British
Dominions, whereas the law as laid down by the Court here [meaning Singapore]
would not be binding even upon the Court itself.
Id.
69.
Frustrated 10 years earlier in their attempt to bring the custom of the sea before a
court of law for condemnation [in the Euxine incident], the officials of the Home
Office and that of the treasury solicitor may have taken particular pains over the
prosecution of the latest cannibals to land in England, but most of the prepara-
tory work is undocumented.
Id. at 195.
70. The major problem in the proceedings was the question of the proper procedure
to follow under the Judicature Act of 1873, which had changed the entire structure of the
English court system. See id. at 218-23. But, other problems also abounded. For exam-
ple, we learn that Baron Huddleston, described as "the Devious Baron Huddleston" by
Professor Simpson, made a critical blunder in describing the vessel in his draft of the
special verdict that had been read to the jury. The Baron therefore had to quietly alter
the special verdict; otherwise, there may have been no jurisdiction over the defendants.
Id. at 218. For other problems which arose when the case was before the reviewing court
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss2/9
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phens' fate: although convicted, they were quickly pardoned by
Queen Victoria on the advice of the Home Secretary."
The final section is also the final chapter of the book,72 and
it is here, if anywhere, that Professor Simpson lets his readers
down. Throughout the prosecution and trial of the defendants,
there was never any hatred for Dudley or Stephens. Indeed,
there was great sympathy for both of them. An offer was made
to defend them for free, 73 subscriptions were raised by the pub-
lic for their support," and their families suffered no indignities
at the hands of the community. 75 Feelings ran so high for the
two that the prosecution privately expressed serious doubt that
a conviction could be secureds.7  Despite the goodwill toward
Dudley and Stephens, the government decided to prosecute the
case so that the law could declare that necessity was an insuffi-
cient defense to criminal homicide. Once this was done, and
Dudley and Stephens were convicted, there was no need to hold
the defendants; the royal pardon followed in short order.
There is something very disturbing in the idea that
cases - especially criminal cases - are prosecuted by the sov-
ereign in order to make new law. It is one thing to prosecute a
see id. at 225-29.
71. Id. at 242-45. The pardon granted Dudley and Stephens was not a so-called free
pardon, but merely a commutation of their terms to the time already served. This result
is similar to that of the Holmes case. See supra note 44. Those arguing for a prison term
equal to the time already served wanted to establish a principle, but did not want to turn
public sympathies against the government by imposing a long prison sentence. Thus, the
purpose of the exercise was not to punish Dudley and Stephens, but only to establish
that marine cannibalism was unacceptable. See id. at 247. Whether the exercise was suc-
cessful is an open question. See Glazebrook, The Necessity Plea in English Common
Law, 30 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 87, 113-14 (1972) ("The Court simply held that the facts did not
disclose a situation of necessity which would justify killing the lad. . . . Dudley and Ste-
phens is not, as is sometimes supposed, an authority against the recognition of a neces-
sity plea on a charge of murder."); J. STEPHEN, DIGEST OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 25 n.1 (5th
ed. 1894) ("I can discover no principle in the judgment in R. v. Dudley. It depends en-
tirely on its peculiar facts.").
72. Chapter 10 is entitled "Aftermath." It is followed by a number of appendices,
bibliographical notes and an index.
73. SIMPSON, supra note 2, at 195. As Professor Simpson explains, the prosecution
insisted on the best defense lawyers available to avoid any suggestion that the defen-
dants had been deprived of satisfactory counsel. Id. at 195-96.
74. Id. at 86.
75. Indeed, even the family of Richard Parker did not harbor anger against the men.
Id. at 84.
76. See id. at 90.
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case and have new law develop as a result. In these cases there is
a perceived need to punish the individuals - a wish to bring
the specific defendants to justice. These decisions are very dif-
ferent from ones in which defendants are prosecuted without
any belief that the specific defendants should be brought to jus-
tice, in order to make new law.77
The idea that the state may choose a case because it
presents an opportunity to formulate new law is frequently dis-
cussed." Indeed, the choice is presented everyday to public
prosecutors throughout the world, who must decide whether to
continue a case, accept a plea bargain, or drop charges.79 It is
therefore not suggested that Professor Simpson should have cov-
ered the whole subject again in his work. But if his purpose, as
stated in the preface, is to discuss the case of Regina v. Dudley
& Stephens"° in its proper historical prospective, then the sub-
ject of prosecutorial discretion and the choice that society faces
in pressing or dropping charges clearly needs to be discussed.
Although Professor Simpson sometimes touches the question in
oblique ways,81 there is no thorough discussion of the propriety
of the decision to charge Dudley and Stephens in order to estab-
lish a common law precedent.
The power of any state, regardless of its political or social
philosophies, is awesome, and nowhere is this power so starkly
displayed as when it is arrayed against a small group of defen-
dants in a criminal proceeding. How this power is wielded by
77. Why a particular prisoner should be punished can be answered in any number of
ways: to deter others, to extract retribution, to rehabilitate, and so forth. What is impor-
tant to understand here is that Dudley and Stephens did suffer punishment - they
were imprisoned for six month and lengthy legal proceedings were brought against
them - but this punishment was not meted out to punish Dudley and Stephens indi-
vidually, for they were not viewed as having done anything extraordinary.
78. The matter is discussed at length in Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MOD-
ERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 905-62 (5th ed. 1980).
79. See LaFave, The Prosecutor's Discretion in the United States, 18 AM. J. COMP.
L. 532 (1970).
80. 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884).
81. See SIMPSON, supra note 2, at 239-42. But these few pages, coming toward the
end of the text and representing roughly one percent of the book, hardly cover the sub-
ject. The matter is also mentioned during the discussion of the Euxine incident, see
supra note 64 and accompanying text, but again in an incidental way. What is really
needed is a chapter devoted to the question, with a comparison of prosecutorial discre-




those selected to dispense justice is a telling indication of how
much progress a society has made towards civility and decency.
Indeed, the amount of freedom a society enjoys can be measured
by whether its people enjoy the "right to be let alone," which
has been stated to be the first principle of individual freedom.2
It is submitted that Dudley and Stephens, and all of Victo-
rian England, did not enjoy much freedom. It is not that Dudley
and Stephens were right to kill Parker; indeed, perhaps they
were wrong and deserved to die on the gallows for their act.
What is shocking about the case (and the speedy, expected par-
don from the Crown) is that Dudley and Stephens were mere
proxies, in some ways wholly superfluous to the trial. The real
defendant on trial in the courtroom in which Tom Dudley and
Edwin Stephens were convicted was a tradition of the sea, a de-
fendant that could not be brought into the courtroom.
The failing, then, of Professor Simpson's work, is that he
hides from us what was the real tragedy of the sinking of the
Mignonette. It was not her foundering, the incredible agony suf-
fered by her crew, or the killing of Richard Parker. It was the
abuse of the legal system that under the pretext of prosecuting
Dudley and Stephens, was actually attempting to establish a
principle of justice. Can justice really spring from such a
proceeding?
82. The "right to be let alone" is thought to have first been stated by Louis Bran-
deis while he was still in private practice in the now famous article, Brandeis & Warren,
The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). See H. CHASE & C. DUCAT, CONSTITU-
TIONAL INTERPRETATION 1126-62 (2d ed. 1979) for a further discussion of the right to be
let alone.
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